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LEVERAGING SOCIAL SCIENCE EXPERTISE IN IMMIGRATION POLICYMAKING

Ming H. Chen

ABSTRACT— The longstanding uncertainty about how policymakers should grapple with social science demonstrating racism persists in the modern administrative state. This Essay examines the uses and misuses of social science and expertise in immigration policymaking. More specifically, it highlights three immigration policies that dismiss social scientific findings and expertise as part of presidential and agency decision-making: border control, crime control, and extreme vetting of refugees to prevent terrorism. The Essay claims that these rejections of expertise undermine both substantive and procedural protections for immigrants and undermine important functions of the administrative state as a curb on irrationality in policymaking. It concludes by suggesting administrative, political, and judicial mechanisms that would encourage policymakers to leverage expertise and curb irrationality in immigration policymaking.

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INTRODUCTION

In the Northwestern University Law Review’s 2017 Symposium: “A Fear of Too Much Justice?: Equal Protection and the Social Sciences 30 Years After McCleskey v. Kemp,” social scientists and experts demonstrate racial disparities in criminal justice, marriage equality, civil rights, and many other areas of social life. Yet courts routinely overlook this evidence, instead pushing policy based on erroneous assumptions. The same is true in the administrative state. If anything, McCleskey’s legacy has gained momentum in a Trump Administration that mistrusts intellectualism and endorses policies without a sound evidentiary basis.

The rejection of expertise is particularly problematic when it comes to recent immigration policy. If correcting racial bias has been elusive under the Equal Protection Clause and civil rights statutes, it has been even more elusive where immigrants are concerned. The most significant immigration policy changes have been announced by the President and his political advisors. The administrative agencies implementing these decisions accord significant weight to political considerations. They adopt their policies swiftly and with minimal justification or factual foundation. Courts evaluating agency decisions traditionally defer to these agencies and to Congress, precisely because they are steeped in political judgments.

Given that immigration policies involve hotly-contested values and high-stakes consequences for immigrants, from an institutional standpoint, immigration policy should involve more expertise and less politics.
Adopting evidence-based policy requires opening up immigration policymaking to internal and external voices that operate on the basis of reliable, expert information. It also requires a measure of independence to counter excesses in political decision-making. These voices might be administrative agencies internal to the executive branch. They might come from political channels including Congress, citizen advisory groups, or interest groups. Or they might be judicial avenues of reviewing agency reasoning and records.

This Essay examines the deficient use of social science and expertise in the modern administrative state. More specifically, it highlights key immigration policies that dismiss social scientific findings and expertise as part of presidential and agency decision-making. This dismissal undermines both substantive and procedural protections for immigrants. Part I presents background on the key principles and structures that have led agencies to reject considerations of social science and expertise in policymaking. It then explains how this rejection has been even more pronounced in immigration law and policymaking. Part II presents examples of three signature immigration policies that dismiss relevant social science expertise: border control, crime control, and extreme vetting of refugees to prevent terrorism. Part III shows how applying traditional administrative law principles to the immigration context would encourage agencies to better leverage expertise in immigration policy.

I. ADMINISTRATIVE STATE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE EXPERTISE

Administrative agencies have wrestled with the incorporation of expertise in their policymaking since their inception. This Part provides a brief look at this history, exploring how agencies first embraced social science evidence through the use of experts and procedures that promote reasoned decision-making. It then describes why these agency officials and procedures are missing in the realm of immigration policymaking.

A. Rise and Decline of Social Science Expertise in Administrative Law

The push and pull between expertise and democratic accountability animated agency decision-making during the New Deal and civil rights era. These eras saw the expansion of the administrative state built on the need for expertise in policymaking. Administrative law scholar James O. Freedman says that the origins of the administrative state reveal the “commitment to expertise as a principal justification for the administrative
process.” He cites one of the founding figures in administrative law, James Landis, as saying of agencies in the New Deal era:

[With] the rise of regulation, the need for expertness became dominant; for the art of regulating an industry requires knowledge of the details of its operation, ability to shift requirements as the conditions of the industry may dictate, the pursuit of energetic measures upon the appearance of an emergency, and the power through enforcement to realize conclusions as to policy.\(^2\)

The judicial opinions reviewing administrative power during this time of expanding federal power similarly recognized that modern life had become too complex for the President or Congress to regulate without assistance.\(^3\) William O. Douglas said, “Administrative government . . . is democracy’s way of dealing with the overcomplicated social and economic problems of today.”\(^4\)

An enduring concern for democratic accountability accompanied the expansion of expertise in agencies. The edifice of modern administrative law offered two main safeguards to prevent arbitrary decision-making and to mitigate the absence of direct electoral accountability, both of which remain relevant to immigration policymaking today: experts and administrative procedure.

### B. Civil Servants and Other Neutral Experts

Chief among these safeguards was the creation of a professionalized civil service that would serve as neutral experts within a political system.\(^5\) The rise of neutral experts during this time period promised both a substantive and structural check on politics.

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\(^2\) *Id.* at 364 (citing JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23–24 (1938)).


\(^5\) Landis wrote that expertise “springs only from that continuity of interest, that ability and desire to devote fifty-two weeks a year, year after year, to a particular problem.” LANDIS, supra note 2, at 23. Felix Frankfurter shared Landis’s faith in disinterested expertise as a mechanism of social regulation and desire for “a highly trained and disinterested permanent service, charged with the task of administering the broad policies formulated by [the government].” FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 145 (1930).
Substantively, the civil servant class was expected to accumulate experience in the increasingly complex matters of policy and provide increased capacity to implement policies enacted by the President and Congress. While not always social scientists by training, they offered learned expertise. Structurally, career civil servants provided an internal separation of powers that functioned as a check on political leadership within agencies and a counterbalance against presidential interference. Civil servants blunted the force of political goals due to their fidelity to statutes, organizational missions, and professional duties. They drew upon learned expertise in administrative and policy substance and had access to a wider array of expert information and research as they conducted their jobs, especially if they fully engaged norms of consultation and deliberation while fashioning policy. They tended to serve for long periods of time across multiple administrations, giving them the long view and tempering the fluctuations of volatile changes. As the next Section details, they also commissioned reports from external experts.

C. Advisory Councils, Academics, and Researchers as Independent Experts

A second type of expert came from outside the government. Policymakers in Congress and agencies supplemented the learned expertise of their career staff with expertise from a cadre of independent researchers. Lawmakers sought out these experts for staff advisory councils or conferred with agency experts on an informal basis while those experts

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maintained their positions in universities and nonprofit organizations. Councils of advisors offered a useful alternative to the singular voice within an agency that reported to a single political figure. They were able to provide peer review of specific findings and offer an array of views when the social science did not lead inevitably to a single policy solution.9 Ranging from scientists to economists to statisticians, these experts offered their professional norms around information gathering and rigorous research in order to shape policymaking. While their findings in controversial policy areas were not without their own biases, they furnished a foundation for forging policy based on norms from their profession rather than norms from politics.

D. Procedures to Facilitate Reasoned Decision-Making in Agencies

In addition to the search for neutral experts, Congress and courts turned to administrative procedure to reinforce principles of reasoned decision-making and to avoid arbitrary and capricious decision-making. In Beyond Accountability, Professor Lisa Bressman threads the concern for avoiding arbitrariness and abuse of discretion through several stages of U.S. history:10 first, early thought of administrative agencies as a “mere transmission belt” for legislative action;11 then, the rise of 1930s New Deal agencies engaged in social reform and economic regulation;12 and finally, 1960s public-interest-minded agencies striving to advance a veritable rights revolution by curbing abuses of discretion.13 In A Place for Agency Expertise, Professor Wendy Wagner extends this history by recounting the rise and the fall of agencies.14 Professor Wagner illuminates the growing distrust of the “geek squad” or agency-as-expert model: during the social

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12 See generally MASHAW, supra note 6, at 187–208 (describing expert agency overseeing steamboat safety); Schiller, supra note 7.


14 See Wagner, supra note 9, at 2025–26.
regulation of the 1960–70s, some regulated groups began to worry about agency capture and politicized purpose. Courts reviewing agency decisions responded by requiring agencies to identify their assumptions, methods, and evidence, as well as explain their reasoning. These concerns also led to the rise of decision-making procedures that promote transparency and enable public oversight.

These procedural safeguards have solidified in the modern era. Rather than sorting out the bounds of substantive expertise or ruling on specific findings, the twenty-first century model of the agency-as-expert relies on a highly proceduralized approach to decision-making. Some of the requirements are contained in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), passed by Congress in 1946, and subsequent transsubstantive legislation intended to heighten political accountability. Many organic statutes include requirements as to what an agency must, can, or cannot consider in making its decisions. For example, the Endangered Species Act specifies that no agency can take any action with a potential effect on an endangered species without first consulting the Secretary of the Interior to render a biological opinion that the action does not threaten an endangered species. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 requires federal agencies to conduct environmental impact analyses that can be weighed against economic motivations and technological feasibility when making decisions that could affect the quality of the human and natural environment. Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to conduct cost-benefit analyses of significant regulatory actions and submit them to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. The APA and some of these other legislative requirements are not binding on the head of the administrative state, the President. However, past presidents have been more open to the inclusion of science and other data in policymaking than President Trump.

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15 Wagner cites especially scientific decisions from health/risk-management and environment giving rise to these attacks, at least some of the time from regulated entities with opposing interests. Id.


20 See Scientific Integrity: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 10671 (Mar. 11, 2009) (President Obama’s memorandum stating “[t]o the extent permitted by law, there should be transparency in the preparation, identification, and use of scientific and technological information in policymaking”). Other reinforcing executive directives came from the
E. Consideration of Reason and Expertise in the Immigration Agencies

While the prototypical instances of agencies considering expertise arise in technical policy arenas such as the environment or economy, important examples arise in civil rights, immigration policy, and elsewhere. This Essay focuses on immigration policymakers who routinely reject expertise in their policymaking.

In the modern immigration bureaucracy, expertise resides in the career civil servants who work alongside political appointees in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR). There is traditionally a bent toward promoting career staff into leadership positions within the agencies, but there is also a regular infusion of political appointees at the top of the agency. Recognizing the political sensitivity of immigration, the post-9/11 structure of the immigration bureaucracy separates enforcement functions from policymaking functions by professionalizing the role of immigration judges and by concentrating them in the immigration courts, rather than the more politicized Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Learned expertise is supplemented by substantive expertise in areas related to immigration policy such as the Office of Immigration Statistics. But in spite of these efforts, immigration agencies still remain more susceptible to political pressures and less able to cultivate expertise than those in other policy areas.

The Trump Administration has violated the traditional division of enforcement functions by initiating policies in the White House without consulting cabinet leaders in DHS or the State Department, by squelching dissent within agencies, and by conflating the organizational missions of the DHS, DOJ, and State Department in its rush to push change. Consider the initially weak influence of then-DHS Secretary John Kelly on the travel ban and the overly strong influence of Attorney General Jeff Sessions on areas of immigration policy typically administered by the DHS. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the form of peer-review, cost-benefit, and risk-assessment guidelines. Compare this statement with President Trump questioning agency experts, dismissing fake news, and offering “alternative facts” in lieu of political propaganda in his policymaking. See Lochlan Morrissey, Alternative Facts Do Exist: Beliefs, Lies, and Politics, 57 Griffith Review (2017) reprinted in The Conversation (Oct. 4, 2017), http://theconversation.com/alternative-facts-do-exist-beliefs-lies-and-politics-84692 [https://perma.cc/CV8M-WSN8].


ability of civil servants to resist these high-level political changes has been compromised by the firing of interim Attorney General Sally Yates for opposing the travel ban, the intimidation of State Department officials, and threats to the independence of immigration judges and line officers through altered hiring standards and performance metrics.

As far as procedure, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) differs from legislation targeted at other administrative bodies in that it does not require immigration agencies to conduct impact analyses or consult with experts in policymaking. To the extent that immigration agencies voluntarily consider expert advice, they are not bound to follow the findings. Agency heads can promulgate policies without developing any factual record. The factual record that immigration judges’ decisions rest upon in immigration adjudication can be quite limited, even in cases where the facts rather than legal issues are crucial to the resolution of the case. In asylum cases, for example, establishing the credibility of an asylum-seeker’s professed fear of persecution through expert testimony or reports on the safety of country conditions for return is exceedingly difficult due to precarious circumstances. Additionally, the Board of

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27 Indeed, earlier immigration laws limiting admissions from certain countries were based on dubious facts about immigrants based on eugenics. See, e.g., Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, Pub. L. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153 (May 26, 1924) (containing provisions prohibiting dysgenic Italians and Eastern European Jews). This example raises the important question of how to separate reliable social science from more dubious or politically-motivated claims, which should be examined more fully in future research.

28 The requirements for reliance on Federal Advisory Committee Act findings are scant and mostly limit the influence of the Committee. See, e.g., Federal Advisory Committee Act § 5(b)(3), 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(3) (2012) (requiring appropriate provisions to assure that the advice and recommendations of the Advisory Committee will not be inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or special interest). Consequently, THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS INTO AMERICAN SOCIETY, NAT’L ACAD. SCI. Preface vii-viii (Mary C. Waters & Marisa Gerstein Pineau eds., 2015) [hereinafter NAS Report], notes the aim of the report is “to facilitate a more informed and fact-based discussion” of immigrant integration based on commissioned research and panel discussions with experts.
Immigration Appeals (BIA) and reviewing courts are constrained in their ability to second-guess the record. Yet “[n]o mechanism exists . . . to assure fundamental fairness in how country conditions information is utilized in the decision-making process.” Consequently, a lot of immigration law and asylum is based on common sense impressions of migrant behavior, rather than on social science or expertise.

Compounding the weakening of structural provisions that allow for expertise to influence policymaking, immigration policy rests on loose procedures. This is largely due to the traditionally deferential posture of courts to the President in matters impacting national sovereignty, the exceptional status for law enforcement and national security policymaking, and the fact that immigration agencies are exempt from many of the procedural requirements that apply in other contexts, such as compliance with the APA.

While more factors are certainly at play in immigration policymaking, this brief history illuminates structural features, such as the resistance to experts and the deficiency of procedure, that contribute to problematic tendencies of modern immigration policy to dismiss expertise.

II. REJECTION OF EXPERTISE IN IMMIGRATION POLICYMAKING

The history of immigration policy shows a persistent rejection of expertise, across parties and across time. Government officials have ignored, misused, and even lied about social science expertise. They have also rejected civil servant expertise in favor of political leadership in the White House or agencies with political objectives. Part II discusses several notable departures from expertise in the signature immigration policies of recent presidential administrations. It focuses especially on rejections of social science evidence in border control, crime control, and treatment of refugees.

A. Border Control and Policies of Self-Deportation

Federal immigration policy in both parties has made false assumptions about the factors driving unauthorized migration, as evidenced by the Obama and Trump Administrations. The Obama Administration’s categorization of recent arrivals as high priorities for removal assumed that strong enforcement would deter continued unauthorized crossings,

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30 Id. at 197.

31 Id.
especially for children and families. These assumptions have resulted in both Administrations’ calls for a border wall, family detention, and the speedy disposition of cases through “rocket dockets” in immigration courts as a means of deterring unauthorized crossings. They have also led to draconian public benefit laws that attempt to promote “self-deportation” by limiting access to basic necessities such as work, housing, and schooling, and otherwise making the lives of undocumented immigrants more difficult. In addition, President Trump’s executive orders punishing use of public benefits or restricting employer-sponsored migration assume that immigrants come to the United States to take jobs and public benefits, and that their willingness to come in contravention of immigration law reflects a desire to exploit and disrespect the rule of law.

These false and uncritically adopted presumptions in border policy overlook sociological evidence of the factors driving migration. Studies of migration offer several theories for why people migrate that contravene the notion that a border wall would stop immigration. Sociologist Douglas Massey has cast doubt on the neoclassical push-pull factor model, which presumes that individuals conduct cost-benefit analyses in their decisions to migrate from less-developed economies for job opportunities. Massey offers an alternative interpretation: that undocumented immigration is

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33 The term “rocket docket” refers to the Obama Administration’s use of prioritized docketing in immigration court. See, e.g., With the Immigration Court’s Rocket Docket Many Unrepresented Families Quickly Ordered Deported, TRAC IMMIGR. REP. (Oct. 18, 2016), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/441/ [https://perma.cc/LMZ2-E7TV].

34 For example, in R.I.L. v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 189–90 (D.D.C. 2015), the DHS, relying on Jonathan Hiskey et al., Democracy, Governance, and Emigration Intentions in Latin America and the Caribbean, 49 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 89 (2014), argued that family detention was necessary to halt chain migration. Professor Hiskey said his report was used for contentions not supported by his research. See R.I.L-R, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 190. The D.C. District Court said that the DHS evidence of a security threat was too weak to justify detention as deterrence. See id.


partly the result of perverse effects of U.S. border policy. In Massey’s account, border control produces the illegality it is meant to prevent by blocking circular migration patterns that would otherwise be preferred by migrant families. Recent counts show that the number of border apprehensions is down, but this is partly because of improving economic conditions in Mexican migration and not solely related to enforcement actions. Relatedly, policymakers’ assumptions that immigrants migrate to manipulate work benefits, obtain public education and social benefits, and procure family sponsorship ignore evidence that these factors do not

38 See id. See generally Alejandro Portes & Józef Böröcz, Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives on Its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation, 23 INTL. MIGRATION REV. 606 (1989) (surveying common theories about labor migration and presenting alternative hypotheses).
39 See MASSEY ET AL., supra note 37, at 105–41.
by themselves drive migration decisions. Instead, migration entails more complex decision-making. Moreover, the initial reasons to migrate may evolve into a different decision about whether to remain and where to reside within the United States.\textsuperscript{45}

These mistaken understandings of unauthorized migration are even more pronounced in the context of forced migration. The Central American border surge has been primarily the result of immigrants fleeing persecution, and, therefore, has not been deterred by border crackdowns, priority docketing in immigration courts, and family detention policies. Copious expert testimony has demonstrated that country conditions in Central America propel migrants to take the risk of unauthorized migration; many of these migrants turn themselves over to ICE and file affirmative asylum applications in the belief that they have a legal right to remain in the United States.\textsuperscript{46} Professor Ingrid Eagly’s research on family detention shows that practices of detention do not deter forced migration and that increased staffing and expedited procedures to reduce immigration court delays do not overcome enticements for those seeking asylum to stay in the United States.\textsuperscript{47}

Policies of self-deportation and “enforcement by attrition” make many of the same false assumptions about factors driving unauthorized migration to the United States. The most prominent of these is Arizona’s S.B. 1070 “show me your papers” provision.\textsuperscript{48} A coalition of civil rights groups settled a lawsuit and the ACLU filed a separate racial profiling lawsuit against Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio for racially biased

\textsuperscript{45} Massey et al., supra note 37, at 9–12.


immigration enforcement practices. Litigants also challenged S.B. 1070 provisions intended to encourage self-deportation. Social science evidence shows that it is more likely these draconian circumstances encourage immigrants to move from one state to another within the United States rather than discourage their initial migration to the United States. The experience of copycat laws in Utah and southern states like Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina further vindicate that these are patterns of internal migration that channel, rather than eradicate, unauthorized migration.

Some of these policies rest upon contestable facts about the causes of migration, where there is reasonable disagreement among experts. But others rest on disregard of social science and professional expertise, or on misrepresentation of facts in the service of a political agenda.

B. Criminal Aliens and Sanctuary Cities

An equally strong belief in immigrant criminality has motivated recent federal immigration policies that prioritize enforcement against criminal aliens and more recently, punish sanctuary cities for resisting ICE requests to transfer these criminal aliens to detention. Examples include Congress’s expansion of the criminal grounds for deportation and eradication of prosecutorial discretion, the Obama Administration’s ICE priorities for removals, and the Trump Administration’s targeting of criminal aliens as


50 See Ortega Melendres, et al., supra note 49.


54 See supra note 32.
gang members and terrorists. These policies are meant to exclude undesirable immigrants from the United States and prevent incidents of violent crimes within the United States, as well as prioritize enforcement against the most dangerous immigrants.

But numerous studies show that the belief that immigrants commit more crime is false. A 2015 American Immigration Council report showed that immigrants do not actually commit more crime. Think tanks from across the political spectrum have reached consistent results. An eminent task force of social scientists reported that immigrants commit more crime after spending time in the United States, mirroring trends in the general population, as opposed to before they enter the country. These reports demonstrate how stereotypes and perceptions of immigrant crime are driven by the construction of immigrant criminality rather than facts.

55 The DHS and DOJ trumpet Operation Raging Bull as an enforcement action targeting MS-13 gang members that has resulted in hundreds of arrests. See ICE’s ‘Operation Raging Bull’: Nets 267 MS-13 Arrests, ICE (last updated Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.ice.gov/features/raging-bull [https://perma.cc/2TYD-8ZDC].
56 ICE spokesperson James Schwab resigned on March 12, 2018 because he felt that he could no longer perpetuate misleading facts about immigrants and the effects of sanctuary policies on the dangers they posed to their community. See Hamed Aleaziz, San Francisco’s ICE Spokesman Quits, Disputes Agency’s Claim that 800 Eluded Arrest, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/ICE-spokesman-said-to-quit-over-officials-12748022.php [https://perma.cc/63Z5-MHTT]. Schwab went on to say that “It’s the job of a public affairs officer to offer transparency for the agency you work for . . . I’ve never been in a situation when I’ve been asked to ignore the facts because it was more convenient . . .” Id. Schwab later told CNN, “I just couldn’t bear the burden -- continuing on as a representative of the agency and charged with upholding integrity, knowing that information was false.” Dan Simon, ICE Spokesman in SF Resigns and Slams Trump Administration Officials, CNN (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/12/politics/ice-spokesman-resigns-san-francisco/index.html [https://perma.cc/LV6R-MFXF].
58 Similar findings have been reached across the political spectrum by the Se.
59 See generally Jennifer M. Chacon, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 613 (2012); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 

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These social science facts counter the Trump Administration’s claims that Mexico is not sending us their best, that they are sending rapists and murderers, and that immigrants are “bad hombres.” They also counter the Obama Administration’s assumptions about dangerous criminal aliens justifying priorities, expansion of statutory grounds for deportation, and widespread use of detention as measures to prevent crime or promote public safety. In addition, social scientists have shown that street gangs made up of Central American immigrants, such as MS-13, were formed in Los Angeles and led to migrant criminality after immigrants returned from deportation, rather than criminality preceding migration to the United States.

False belief in immigrant criminality has also led to the Trump Administration’s public hostility towards sanctuary city policies, which seek to restrict local police communication with federal immigration officials, and President Trump’s many attempts to penalize the jurisdictions that do not cooperate. The high-profile killing of Kate Steinle by an undocumented immigrant, whom San Francisco police had previously released, fueled the public impression that sanctuary policies enable violence. But underneath the impッションed politics and public scandals, it


62 See Memorandum from Sec’y of Homeland Sec. Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 32.

63 See CLAIRE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RES. SERV., GANGS IN CENTRAL AMERICA (2016). Attorney General Sessions also conflates unaccompanied children from Central America with the gang members and with DACA youth migration in a subsequent policy speech. See Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Remarks about Carrying Out the President’s Immigration Priorities, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-about-carrying-out-presidents-immigration [https://perma.cc/WF78-NVZG] (“The open-borders lobby talks a lot about kids—those who are here unlawfully . . . . After the previous administration announced [DACA] in 2012, the number of unaccompanied children coming here nearly doubled in one year. The next year, it doubled again. I doubt that was a coincidence. DACA encouraged potentially tens of thousands of vulnerable children to make the dangerous journey North.”).


is an empirical issue whether sanctuary cities lead to more violent crime from immigrants. Professor Tom Wong, a U.C. San Diego political scientist, conducted a study which concluded that “[c]rime is statistically significantly lower in sanctuary counties compared to nonsanctuary counties.”66 This study was misquoted by Attorney General Jeff Sessions in his statement that sanctuary cities facilitate more crime.67 A similar misattribution happened with a study authored by Professor Loren Collingwood and colleagues at U.C. Riverside, which has been misinterpreted to support the same conclusion that sanctuary jurisdictions are more dangerous.68 Many law enforcement officials actually believe that sanctuary policies prevent crime, and that jurisdictions without such policies inadvertently promote crime by creating immigrant mistrust of the police force. For example, a blue ribbon task force consisting of law enforcement officials found sufficient cause for concern that they issued a split recommendation to abandon the Secure Communities program, a program that required county jails to assist federal immigration agents by granting immigration detainers.69 The task force found the program was ineffective and perceived by the public as unfair, because minor offenses were conflated with violent crime.70 Litigation in San Francisco and Chicago challenging President Trump’s sanctuary city sanctions suggest that the policies are deficient due to their arbitrary adoption and other constitutional concerns.71


69 See HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, TASK FORCE ON SECURE COMMUNITIES FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 27 (2011).

70 See id. at 24.

What would it take instead to encourage local compliance with federal immigration enforcement against criminal aliens? Attorney General Sessions assumes sanctions and sticks work best, as with his threats to withhold federal public safety grants to noncooperating jurisdictions⁷² or his lawsuit challenging California’s sanctuary policies.⁷³ But social science evidence demonstrates these types of policies rest on a misunderstanding of what it takes to get sanctuary cities to comply.⁷⁴ According to procedural justice research, threatening sanctuary jurisdictions with sanctions is not going to encourage voluntary cooperation or compliance.⁷⁵ In work inspired by social psychologist Tom Tyler, legal scholars studying immigration detainers—federal requests for local police to detain criminal aliens who would otherwise be eligible for release—have found that the primary motivator of local noncompliance is lack of legitimacy of these requests.⁷⁶ Although the time frame of the study makes it difficult to prove conclusively, President Obama’s replacement Priorities Enforcement Program (PEP), which pulled back on the Secure Communities program by requesting notification of release rather than holding and reserving detainer requests for more serious crimes, would have led to greater compliance.⁷⁷ Additionally, my prior research, informed by the procedural justice studies of Tom Tyler, hypothesized an increase in the number of jurisdictions resisting cooperation after President Trump’s subsequent reinstatement of Secure Communities.⁷⁸ And indeed, President Trump’s Executive Order restoring Secure Communities⁷⁹ and Attorney General Sessions’s threats to

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⁷⁴ See infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.

⁷⁵ See infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.


⁷⁷ See Priority Enforcement Program, ICE (last updated June 22, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/pep [https://perma.cc/65UV-A9V3]; see also Memorandum from Homeland Sec’y Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 32 (eradicating Secure Communities and discrediting the tactic of using immigration detainers to boost deportation).

⁷⁸ Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cities After Secure Communities, 36 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 335, 348 (2015); see also Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 32.

sanctuary cities and states should lead to continuing noncompliance. Litigation in San Francisco and Chicago challenging Trump’s Executive Order shows that these policies have not encouraged greater cooperation with federal policies. Beyond the litigation in San Francisco and Chicago, more than thirty states or localities have adopted sanctuary policies following Trump’s Executive Order, most strengthening rather than weakening sanctuary provisions. In one of the most far-reaching sanctuary policies, California adopted a sanctuary law that is even bolder and broader in scope: California S.B. 54 goes a step further than not honoring detainers, and directs law enforcement agencies to ignore federal requests for release dates as well (with caveats for some crimes), in addition to not allowing local law enforcement to house detainees under contract. California has additionally adopted state laws restricting private employers’ cooperation with worksite enforcement. Not every jurisdiction has moved in this direction, but the trends are notable.

Policies that promote public safety or allocate resources to prioritize criminal behavior among immigrants over less serious offenses are not unreasonable. However, enacting such policies on the basis of false or exaggerated claims of immigrant criminality, rather than on the basis of...
legitimate social science research, damages immigrants and communities alike.

C. Exclusion of Refugees

Further, the Trump Administration’s exclusion of refugees has exaggerated the national security threat presented by refugees from Muslim-majority countries and overlooked evidence of the rigor of vetting practices. As a result, in a move to reverse President Obama’s increased refugee admissions, the Trump Administration’s policies lowered the refugee cap by more than half. President Trump’s 45,000 cap is the lowest level recommended since 1980.

The premise of the lower levels of refugee admission is that the refugees from Muslim-majority countries pose a national security threat during a time of terrorist attacks and the corollary belief that vetting practices have been inadequate to stem this threat. Then-acting Attorney General Sally Yates expressed reservations about the legality of the policy, leading to her abrupt firing. State Department dissent from 1,000 diplomats about the security threat was similarly squelched. However, the

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89 There have been many examples of President Trump and candidate Trump making statements labeling refugees as terrorists and security risks. See, e.g., Remarks by President Trump on the Administration’s National Security Strategy, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-administrations-national-security-strategy [https://perma.cc/Q8YP-XT24]. These have been part of the grounds for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits enjoining the travel ban as religious or national origin discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the INA. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Program v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018); Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017).


Fourth and Ninth Circuit litigation subsequently blocking the travel ban as a whole contains specific statements of concern about insufficient evidence of the security threat and possibly irrational and discriminatory anti-Muslim bias. Refugee service providers, news outlets, and past government officials have tried to describe the rigorous vetting of refugees overseas, and news analysts have pointed out that those who flee a tyrant government share the United States’ dislike of the regime, not a sympathy for the goals of the oppressor. Nevertheless, under the veil of anti-Muslim suspicion long present in the United States, recent policies continue to conflate terrorists and their victims. The false equivalence of refugees with terrorists has led to reductions and outright suspensions in refugee admissions, as well as calls for increased vetting prior to admission. It has also inspired more burdensome procedures for obtaining a green card and subsequently naturalizing from within the United States. Finally, this

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92 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Program, 857 F.3d at 596 (“EO-2’s text does little to bolster any national security rationale . . . ”); Hawaii, 878 F.3d at 699 (“[T]he President has failed to make sufficient findings that the ‘entry of certain classes of aliens would be detrimental to the national interest.’”).

93 On the second travel ban, for example, the Fourth Circuit said “EO-2 cannot be divorced from the cohesive narrative linking it to the animus that inspired it. In light of this, we find that the reasonable observer would likely conclude that EO-2’s primary purpose is to exclude persons from the United States on the basis of their religious beliefs.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Program, 857 F.3d at 601, and that the ban “drips with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination.” Id. at 572. The Plaintiffs’ proposed Second Amended Complaint in the District of Hawaii case contains similar language in opposition to the second travel ban: “[T]he [Executive] Order began life as a Muslim ban” and the latest ban plainly “discriminates on the basis of nationality.” Proposed Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 28, 34, Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (D. Haw. 2017) (No. 17-00050 DKW-KSC).


misconception has created widespread hostility against refugees, especially those from the Middle East.\(^9\)

The social science evidence also disproves the claim that refugees receive more from society than they contribute.\(^10\) This view presumably stems from the relative costs of resettling refugees within the United States (including the affirmative assistance with integration in the form of job placement, language training, and social workers) and from widespread beliefs in welfare abuse or fraud.\(^11\) But the facts do not bear out this misperception. The *New York Times* reported in Fall 2017 that the U.S. government suppressed an analysis stating that refugees benefit the economy.\(^12\) This finding complements evidence from many prior studies showing that refugees integrate and naturalize impressively, relative to other immigrant groups and predictors of success.\(^13\) Still the narrative of the refugee welfare queen has been used to justify presidential policies that reduce refugee admissions and resist refugee resettlement.\(^14\)

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\(^10\) See infra notes 102–103 and accompanying text.


Stemming security threats is an unassailable goal in immigration policymaking. However, seeking to do so without understanding the motivations of both refugees and terrorists is costly. It can lead to unduly restrictive admissions, burdensome vetting, and barriers to integration for refugees. It can sow social division and alienation that give rise to domestic unrest and national security risks. It can lead the United States to violate obligations to international human rights and endanger its relationships with other countries as well.

III. LEVERAGING EXPERTISE IN IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY

Whether through legal avenues or nonlegal ones, policymakers need to be held accountable for the quality of their policies and decisions. This Part proposes measures to enhance the role of expertise and social science evidence in agency decision-making. In general, the recommendations focus on how decisions are made and strive to enhance norms of good governance and to bring immigration policy into alignment with ordinary administrative and constitutional principles.

A. Bringing Presidential Policymaking into the Administrative State

Presidential policymaking and government statements might be outside conventional legal mechanisms of accountability. However, they can and should be supported by administrative involvement that is within the scope of accountability mechanisms. Generally, a president announcing a sweeping executive action ought to consult with the heads of the affected agencies and encourage promulgation of further regulations to carry out those executive orders. Thus, one way presidents can respect expertise is to involve civil servants. As explained in Part I, these professionals offer crucial long-term experience and some independence from politics. These qualities balance presidential influence during a time when presidential action is dominating immigration policymaking.

Another benefit of involving agencies is that administrative procedure promotes fact-finding and transparency in decision-making. Bringing agency policies into the domain of the APA would lead to increased use of legislative rulemaking. The notice and comment period, in particular, requires that the DHS be more transparent about changes in policy and practice, creates opportunities for public engagement around those changes, and enables all parties to introduce facts into policy deliberations. If these challenges to the DACA rescission that acknowledge arbitrariness for mistakenly presuming the illegality of the program and for overlooking the contributions of DACA recipients to U.S. society. See, e.g., Order Denying FRCP 12(b)(1) Dismissal and Granting Provisional Relief, Regents of The University of California v. DHS, No 3:17-cv-05211-WHA (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2018).
basic administrative principles applied with equal force to immigration law as they do to other areas of administrative law, they would prevent individual abuses of discretion, arbitrariness, and secrecy in immigration enforcement. However, they run counter to current practices of announcing immigration policies swiftly and abruptly, sometimes without even issuing guidance. Effective enforcement does require some latitude for discretion. However, discretion should not be wielded under a veil of secrecy whenever they involve law enforcement, national security, or other forms of immigration exceptionalism.

Normalizing these administrative principles in immigration adjudication at the DOJ is difficult, but vital. An alien has the statutory right to a full and fair hearing and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on his or her own behalf. Yet these principles are only partially and problematically enforced in immigration court. Policymaking through administrative adjudication is vexing as a general matter. The immigration courts and the BIA serve similar functions to administrative law judges and other administrative appeals units, but they operate with even less independence, less public oversight, and less procedure. Immigration adjudication is neither informal nor formal adjudication under the APA, meaning that its procedures are permitted to deviate from normal practice. The chief immigration judge has called on Congress and the President to safeguard the independence of immigration judges from political decision-making; one of her suggestions is to create an Article I immigration court, rather than housing immigration judges in the Department of Justice. These recommendations run contrary to current proposals that seek to weaken rather than strengthen the independence and professionalism of the immigration courts. For instance, Attorney General Sessions has suggested imposition of completion goals that would tilt EOIR decision-making toward removal.

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106 See Dana Leigh Marks, Immigrant Courts Should Be Independent—Not an Arm of the Administration, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 24, 2017) http://prospect.org/article/immigrant-courts-should-be-independent-not-arm-administration [https://perma.cc/64UF-UFRF]. These longstanding calls for greater independence in immigration adjudication are even more necessary in the face of the Trump Administration.
High-stakes policymaking and adjudication should not be made on the basis of an administrative process that does not allow it to gather facts reliably. The normalization of principles of administrative procedure in immigration policymaking and adjudication could encourage greater availability of social science expertise and improve agency reliance on good information instead of political influence alone.¹⁰⁸

B. Political Mechanisms to Improve the Quality of Evidence

Political mechanisms can improve the quality of evidence in immigration policy. Congressional requests for information about immigration policies can push the DHS and the DOJ to describe the factual foundations of their policy decisions and hold them accountable to evidence-backed research about the effectiveness of policies. Congress could amend the APA or the INA to legislate a requirement that agency policies be supported by a factual record that facilitates subsequent review and that studies relied upon disclose the methods, assumptions, and data sources used in crafting their policies. Congress could modify requirements that significant rules already subject to notice and comment or regulatory impact analysis use the “best available evidence.”¹⁰⁹

More broadly, improving the quality and rationality of decision-making in immigration policies using nonlegal avenues of accountability would fill the lacuna of judicial review. Holding immigration policy accountable to expertise through legal means is not easy because not all statements and policies about immigration are correctable through legal recourse. Moreover, many of these enforcement policies are the product of discretion and cannot be challenged on substantive grounds. President Trump’s Twitter statements regarding the purpose of the travel ban or Attorney General Sessions’s televised public statements on sanctuary cities are difficult to review, even if courts have taken notice.¹¹⁰ Many garden-


¹¹⁰ However, the DACA rescission is being challenged under the APA. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 3, Regents of the University of California v. DHS, No. 3:17-cv-05211-WHA, (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2017) (“Defendants failed to ‘articulate a satisfactory explanation’ for their action that would enable a court to conclude that the decision was ‘the product of reasoned decisionmaking.’”) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). A Ninth Circuit hearing included discussion of how the federal government’s position squared with State Farm and agreed there must be a rational connection. See
variety immigration decisions are rendered by Congress to be unreviewable in court by the terms of the INA or subsequent jurisdiction-stripping statutes. Consequently, misinformation or misleading practices that intrude on sound immigration policymaking need to be addressed through nonlegal avenues of accountability such as public discourse and political action. Increasing attention is being paid to the use of FOIA to obtain essential information about immigration enforcement practices and incriminating evidence related to individuals targeted for removal as well. Improving the quality and rationality of decision-making under these constraints rests on an appeal to democratic and social norms more than courts.

That said, all of these evidence-bolstering mechanisms would benefit subsequent review as well. Courts, who are subject nonexperts, could use either the procedural standards or the substantive information generated from compliance with those standards to more effectively review the rationality of the policies. Academic researchers, citizen advisory councils, and public interest organizations who are familiar with social science research would have more opportunities to inform policymaking and correct misstatements under such requirements as well.

C. Strengthening Judicial Review of Immigration Policy.

When courts do review immigration policies, they have difficulty holding immigration decision-makers accountable. Constitutional and statutory requirements for due process and other basic freedoms extend to immigrants. The First Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process Clause apply to persons and not merely citizens, for example, and the INA includes its own procedural constraints. However, recent litigation activity notwithstanding, longstanding precedent shows that these


113 Federal courts have been actively reviewing recent immigration policies such as the travel ban, DACA rescission, and sanctuary city sanctions for both constitutional and statutory compliance. See,
constitutional and statutory provisions are often applied in a more relaxed fashion in the immigration context that disfavors immigrants.\textsuperscript{114} The INA is notoriously unclear and courts often prove unwilling to construe ambiguous provisions in favor of immigrants given that most decisions reside in the civil context, despite their high stakes.

Courts are typically more deferential to immigration agencies in their policymaking than hornbook constitutional and administrative law doctrine would portend, whether due to background assumptions that immigration law is unique or due to the sheer complexity of immigration law. This is not always appropriate. Courts tend to overlook immigration courts’ inconsistent application of legal standards in their review of immigration court decisions and fail to consider that “crimmigration” cases involve interpretative matters under canons not well suited to the harsh consequences associated with detention and deportation. Factual findings routinely arise in immigration court even where the record is slim or where the fact-finding is not governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. In asylum cases that require an asylum seeker’s well-founded fear of persecution, for example, the BIA sometimes adopts State Department reports uncritically in an effort to challenge the petitioner’s claimed persecution, rather than bringing in other social science evidence that would question the assertions of those reports, and sometimes rejects expert testimony unreasonably. Mass adjudication and priority docketing further truncate due process in immigration proceedings. The resulting opinions and administrative appeals are not always well-reasoned and sometimes not reasoned at all.

e.g., \textit{Hawaii}, 878 F.3d 662; Order Denying FRCP 12(b)(1) Dismissal and Granting Provisional Relief, Regents of The University of California v. DHS, No. 3:17-cv-05211-WHA (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2018); \textit{County of Santa Clara}, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497. Initial decisions suggest that some of these policies cannot withstand even the more relaxed judicial review that they currently face. For example, federal courts in the travel ban litigation have questioned the arbitrariness of banning refugees without more evidence of national security threat. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. Litigants challenging the rescission of DACA are asking for more explanation under the APA, after significant waffling and a bungled execution led to post office delays that jeopardized authorized renewals as untimely. See Liz Robbins, \textit{Post Office Fails to Deliver on Time, and DACA Applications Get Rejected}, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/10/nyregion/post-office-mail-delays-daca-applications.html [https://perma.cc/Q593-6PQP]. However, the final result in these cases remains to be seen since many of the decisions involve preliminary stages of litigation and conflicting rulings across the nation may prompt Supreme Court review.

Requiring immigration agencies and immigration courts to engage in better data gathering and truthful reporting is critical to ensuring procedural fairness and substantive integrity in a policy area with such high stakes and such contested values. Courts should review immigration policy under normal standards of constitutional and statutory review. The Constitution should apply in force. Applicable standards for reviewing agency legislative actions would require courts to take a hard look at the rationality of agency decision-making, or at least be sure that the agency has taken a hard look and provided some kind of rational explanation for policy changes. A more searching review of immigration policy would curb the current informality and irregularity of policymaking and adjudicatory decision-making in the high-stakes arena of immigration.

CONCLUSION

The rejection of expertise in immigration policy goes beyond the singular issue of immigration and the singular Trump Administration. But it is particularly consequential in the midst of a populist moment that rejects expertise in the service of a virulent anti-immigrant policy agenda and that relies on missing or erroneous data to strip immigrants of their most basic rights. Immigration law is value-laden and subject to strong political pressure. It is not scientific law and may not lend itself to objective answers or singularly agreed upon solutions. However, it is also not a policy domain bereft of reason, expertise, or evidence. Even if the neutral expert in immigration policymaking is a myth, there should be norms to separate irresponsible immigration policies from normal shifts in administrative policies, priorities, and procedures.

The institutional purpose of agencies is to advance norms of expertise and reasoned decision-making. Building standards for immigration policy based on rationality, expertise, and social science is part of the project of restoring the administrative state, as well as improving immigration policy.

115 This form of review would apply to agency decisions such as the DHS enforcement guidance accompanying the Trump Administration’s interior enforcement executive order, the State Department’s vetting guidelines for implementation of the travel ban, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano’s memo on DACA, and immigration court decisions from the DOJ and EOIR.
