Federal prosecutors face increasing criticism for their failure to indict large banks and bankers for serious criminal conduct, including allowing violent drug cartels to launder hundreds of millions of dollars, willfully conducting business with rogue nations and terrorists, and manipulating the LIBOR to defraud investors. This Article argues that the non-prosecution of banks is often justified by proper consideration of externalities and that the nonprosecution of bankers is often explained by lack of evidence or the difficulty of white-collar prosecutions generally. Nevertheless, the result is that extremely serious criminal conduct is penalized by mere fines and negotiated terms of probation, and this introduces deterrence and expressive costs to the legal system. These costs are significant and ought to be addressed, but the criminal law may not be the most effective tool for confronting criminal conduct by banks and bankers; rather, powerful regulatory tools already exist could resolve the deterrent and expressive shortcomings of the criminal law in this area. Presently, the regulators are not using these tools; they ought to.

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