Document Type
Article
Publication
Cardozo Law Review
Year
2016
Citation Information
Aya Gruber, Consent Confusion, 38 Cardozo L. Rev. 415 (2016), available at https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/faculty-articles/11.
Abstract
The slogans are ubiquitous: “Only ‘Yes’ Means ‘Yes’”; “Got Consent?”; “Consent is Hot, Assault is Not!” Clear consent is the rule, but the meaning of sexual consent is far from clear. The current state of confusion is evident in the numerous competing views about what constitutes mental agreement (grudging acceptance or eager desire?) and what comprises performative consent (passive acquiescence or an enthusiastic “yes”?). This paper seeks to clear up the consent confusion. It charts the contours of the sexual consent framework, categorizes different definitions of affirmative consent, and critically describes arguments for and against affirmative consent. Today’s widespread uncertainty is partly a product of the affirmative consent reform juggernaut and its rapid legal changes. Confusion is also connected to the nature of consent as a liberal, contract principle. Sexual consent appears a morally self-evident issue of free will, but it actually veils a struggle between various judgments about how sex should happen, its benefits and harms, and the role of criminal law in regulating it. Indeed, proponents and critics of affirmative consent entertain different empirical and normative presumptions and often simply talk past each other. Structurally mapping the consent framework and the affirmative consent debate reveals exactly what is at stake in this new world of reform — a revelation necessary for meaningful dialogue on acceptable sex and acceptable sex regulation.
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