Document Type

Article

Publication

New York University Environmental Law Journal

Year

2025

Abstract

The use of corporate climate targets has exploded in recent years and now encompasses many of the world's largest and most profitable companies. In a corporate climate target, a company voluntarily commits to reducing its emissions in line with climate science and the Paris Agreement. The broad adoption of these targets raises important questions: are these commitments truly aligned with science in the way they are advertised, or do they raise "climate-washing" concerns; i.e., do they exaggerate the benefits and significance of the climate targets? This Article investigates the role that science actually plays within targets and explores different types of climate-washing concerns when commitments turn out to be exaggerated. This Article's analysis focuses on corporate targets issued as part of the Science-Based Targets Initiative (SBTi), the preeminent standard-setting body in the field. The Article finds that the role of science in SBTi's rule framework is more complex than it first appears. SBTi rules employ a scientific concept known as the global carbon budget, but scientific knowledge alone cannot translate that carbon budget, which is indeed global, to company-level targets. When SBTi provides that translation in its rules, it is not merely deriving targets from science, but exercising considerable discretion. That discretion, and its distributive implications, are currently under-appreciated in both academia and practice. Building on this analysis, the Article turns to articulating climate-washing concerns in corporate targets and identifying relevant theories of liability. The key, it argues, is to move beyond the instinct that a target can only amount to climate-washing if it is in direct conflict with science. Because science itself cannot determine appropriate company-level targets, the Article helps to identify other avenues through which advocates may pursue climate-washing liability.

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