More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures

Authors

Peter H. Huang, University of Colorado Law SchoolFollow
Ho-Mou Wu, National Taiwan University and Academia Sinica

Document Type

Article

Publication

The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization

Year

1994

Citation Information

Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. Econ. & Org. 390 (1994), available at https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036856.

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036856

Abstract

This article applies psychological game theory to study the maintenance of social order. It models the control of corruption in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. The models possess multiple equilibria, which correspond to certain social norms and organizational cultures or their absence. The models demonstrate how expectations concerning the likelihood of corrupt behavior can influence decisions to engage in such behavior via the magnitude of endogenous remorse on the part of the actor.

Comments

"© 1994 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved."

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